At 12:01 p.m. native time on July 6, China fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from the South China Sea, flying roughly 4,500 miles over open water earlier than splashing down close to the Solomon Islands. The take a look at—the primary such one in many years—concerned a missile able to carrying nuclear warheads and instantly prompted hypothesis that Beijing was making an attempt to ship a message, both to sign its energy or its displeasure towards states within the area. Some Australian analysts even argued that the take a look at was a direct response to Australia’s shock protection treaty with Fiji, which was signed that day.
These interpretations learn an excessive amount of into China’s actions and underestimate each the preparation required for such a take a look at and the bureaucratic and technical causes for conducting it. As a substitute, we must always interpret this take a look at as an effort to validate crucial applied sciences, take a look at operational ideas, and show to China’s political management that the Individuals’s Liberation Military’s (PLA) nuclear forces are able to finishing up their mission if referred to as upon.
At 12:01 p.m. native time on July 6, China fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from the South China Sea, flying roughly 4,500 miles over open water earlier than splashing down close to the Solomon Islands. The take a look at—the primary such one in many years—concerned a missile able to carrying nuclear warheads and instantly prompted hypothesis that Beijing was making an attempt to ship a message, both to sign its energy or its displeasure towards states within the area. Some Australian analysts even argued that the take a look at was a direct response to Australia’s shock protection treaty with Fiji, which was signed that day.
These interpretations learn an excessive amount of into China’s actions and underestimate each the preparation required for such a take a look at and the bureaucratic and technical causes for conducting it. As a substitute, we must always interpret this take a look at as an effort to validate crucial applied sciences, take a look at operational ideas, and show to China’s political management that the Individuals’s Liberation Military’s (PLA) nuclear forces are able to finishing up their mission if referred to as upon.
China has compelling technical causes to conduct SLBM checks. Though Beijing has pursued a sea-based nuclear deterrent because the Nineteen Sixties, its first ballistic missile submarine suffered from important technical issues and barely went to sea.
Solely within the 2000s did China start deploying the extra succesful Kind 094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine. These submarines reportedly started conducting common patrols with nuclear warheads in 2015—comparatively lately in comparison with China’s land-based nuclear forces, which have been operational for many years and profit from in depth testing information. But till July 6, China had by no means earlier than examined an SLBM to its full vary.
There are good geographic causes for this lack of real-world testing. China’s entry to the broader Pacific is blocked by the primary island chain—consisting of Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines—which constrains its means to check long-range missiles with out overflying close by nations in addition to its means to deploy submarines into the Pacific with out being detected by U.S. or Japanese naval forces.
Due to these obstacles, China hardly ever checks long-range missiles over the Pacific and as a substitute has chosen to function its nuclear submarines in bastions—closely defended areas within the South China Sea and the Bohai Sea the place submarines can conceal in crowded waters near the mainland. Whereas this posture enhances survivability, it limits alternatives to conduct testing underneath life like operational circumstances. China can take a look at particular person elements individually, nevertheless it can not simply take a look at whether or not missiles, submarines, and particularly command-and-control techniques can seamlessly work collectively in real-world situations.
This requires end-to-end testing, particularly to stress-test communications and command and management to make sure that launch orders will be reliably transmitted to a number of submarines concurrently to execute a nuclear second strike. That is a very complicated endeavor as a result of submarines are inherently troublesome to speak with, requiring cautious coordination and in depth planning. The USA conducts such checks routinely, most lately in September 2025, when it launched a salvo of 4 take a look at SLBMs off the coast of Florida.
This will have been exactly what China was testing this week. Along with issuing a discover to airmen (NOTAM) overlaying the missile’s flight path from the South China Sea, Beijing additionally issued a separate NOTAM for a missile launch from the Bohai Sea. This implies that the nation might have been exercising each its northern and southern bastions concurrently, doubtless evaluating whether or not its command, management, and communications techniques may reliably talk with nuclear submarines working in numerous theaters.
In the long run, China launched solely a single missile from the South China Sea. That is doubtless as a result of a launch from the Bohai would have required the missile to fly over South Korea and Japan to achieve the designated influence space—a very escalatory transfer that will have jeopardized China’s efforts to painting itself as a accountable nuclear energy.
If Beijing’s major goal had been coercive signaling, then it may have chosen a extra provocative flight path; as a substitute, it chosen the least politically inflammatory choice whereas additionally offering close by nations superior notification, albeit solely half-hour earlier than the launch.
China’s public messaging likewise downplayed the take a look at’s significance. The PLA Navy described the launch as “a routine association of the annual coaching of the PLA Navy” and acknowledged that it “complies with worldwide regulation and worldwide observe, and isn’t directed at any particular nation or goal.” A International Ministry spokesperson additionally stated that the train was a part of common army coaching and was not aimed toward any particular nation or goal. A Protection Ministry spokesperson emphasised that the missile take a look at conforms to worldwide regulation and that its choice to inform different nations “demonstrates the openness and transparency of the Chinese language armed forces.”
State media additionally downplayed the take a look at—together with sure shops seemingly arguing with different, extra aggressive ones over the aim of the take a look at. In the meantime, there was no parallel coordinated media effort to determine the supply of China’s displeasure or to strain regional powers to vary their conduct. The one factor that China is clearly making an attempt to sign is that this was routine.
Some commentators have pointed to the timing of the take a look at, noting that July 7 marks the anniversary of Japan’s full-scale invasion of China within the lead-up to World Battle II. In accordance with this interpretation, the launch was meant to underscore China’s dedication to by no means once more be susceptible to overseas aggression. However the take a look at occurred on July 6 moderately than July 7, and given the Chinese language authorities’s in depth use of coordinated propaganda surrounding politically important dates, the absence of any official narrative connecting the 2 suggests the timing was in all probability coincidental.
As a substitute, it’s doubtless that the date was chosen months, if not years, in the past as a part of the PLA Navy’s testing schedule. Workouts of this complexity require important preparation: Experimental know-how should be prepared, take a look at missiles ready, submarines deployed, and wires uncrossed with different elements of the forms. It’s not one thing that may be determined the week earlier than.
Past the technical causes, there are additionally institutional the reason why the PLA Navy could be desperate to conduct this take a look at. China’s army is underneath immense scrutiny from the nation’s political management following sweeping anti-corruption purges which have eliminated quite a few senior officers, together with a lot of the Central Navy Fee and a former prime normal accused of leaking nuclear secrets and techniques to america. The PLA Navy might wish to show to Chinese language President Xi Jinping and different leaders that it will probably accomplish the missions that it has been assigned.
The take a look at however drew condemnation from america and nations within the area, with the Australian prime minister calling the transfer “provocative” and america drawing consideration to the shortage of Chinese language transparency on the scope and goal of its nuclear buildup. These criticisms are legitimate. China stays unusually secretive about its nuclear modernization program, together with the development lately of roughly 350 nuclear missile silos that it has by no means publicly acknowledged or defined.
However there may be little to be gained by scolding China when, as on this case, it’s enjoying by the accepted guidelines. Though no worldwide authorized devices govern missile checks over worldwide waters, the observe of issuing launch notifications and NOTAMs is a broadly accepted—and usually anticipated—technique of decreasing the dangers related to such actions. China’s willingness to inform regional nations and challenge NOTAMs earlier than testing missiles over the Pacific suggests there could also be room for sensible risk-reduction measures, together with higher transparency about its nuclear decision-making and danger calculus and a willingness to have interaction america throughout a disaster.
China has traditionally been reluctant to make use of those risk-reduction instruments. Probably the most notable instance is the U.S.-China army hotline, the place China has a spotty report of choosing up the cellphone. There have been notable exceptions, nonetheless. Within the fall of 2020, Chinese language considerations that america may launch an assault prompted then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Employees Mark Milley to name his Chinese language counterpart. Extra lately, the nations have additionally made modest progress on synthetic intelligence danger discount, together with joint declarations on limiting how AI is included into nuclear command and management.
However this progress could also be jeopardized if america makes mountains out of molehills associated to comparatively benign Chinese language conduct. If China concludes that it’ll obtain condemnation no matter whether or not it conforms to greatest practices, then it has little incentive to proceed utilizing these practices. As a substitute, presenting China with alternatives to be seen as a accountable energy on this house will open extra doorways for future communication on nuclear weapons and danger discount.
Former U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration took this method after a Chinese language intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch in 2024, when the U.S. Protection Division instructed reporters, “The PRC did give some advance notification of the ICBM take a look at. This can be a step in the proper path to decreasing the dangers of misperception and miscalculation.” (Optimistic reinforcement of this sort might have helped encourage China to proceed offering advance launch notifications.)
Western analysts have a nasty behavior of studying an excessive amount of into Chinese language conduct, over-indexing on the belief that Beijing is making an attempt to ship messages with its each transfer. This behavior is counterproductive and encourages onlookers to learn malicious intent into innocuous strikes doubtless pushed by bureaucratic pressures, which in flip fuels Chinese language paranoia about Western intent and makes China much less prone to have interaction sooner or later.
In the long term, a slower and extra cooperative method on danger discount will yield higher outcomes than demanding that China instantly conform to america’ expectations.
