Nuclear Latency Might Be Strategic for U.S.

U.S. President Donald Trump made headlines final October when he introduced he had given South Korea approval to construct nuclear-powered submarines. It’s unclear whether or not the USA will provide the nuclear gas or allow South Korea to counterpoint its personal, however the latter possibility would successfully give South Korea the technical capability to supply nuclear weapons shortly—inside a matter of months—if it so chooses, a situation referred to as nuclear latency.

To do that, Trump would theoretically want Congress to revise the bilateral U.S.-Korea nuclear cooperation settlement, referred to as the 123 Settlement. Final up to date in 2015, this settlement permits South Korea to counterpoint uranium as much as 20 % and pursue pyroprocessing for civilian functions with U.S. consent. Nevertheless, it explicitly prohibits enriching or reprocessing U.S.-origin nuclear supplies for army use, a class that features gas for nuclear-powered submarines.

U.S. President Donald Trump made headlines final October when he introduced he had given South Korea approval to construct nuclear-powered submarines. It’s unclear whether or not the USA will provide the nuclear gas or allow South Korea to counterpoint its personal, however the latter possibility would successfully give South Korea the technical capability to supply nuclear weapons shortly—inside a matter of months—if it so chooses, a situation referred to as nuclear latency.

To do that, Trump would theoretically want Congress to revise the bilateral U.S.-Korea nuclear cooperation settlement, referred to as the 123 Settlement. Final up to date in 2015, this settlement permits South Korea to counterpoint uranium as much as 20 % and pursue pyroprocessing for civilian functions with U.S. consent. Nevertheless, it explicitly prohibits enriching or reprocessing U.S.-origin nuclear supplies for army use, a class that features gas for nuclear-powered submarines.

However two weeks after Trump’s preliminary announcement, the White Home launched a reality sheet that laid out a approach to bypass Congress altogether. “In step with the bilateral 123 Settlement and topic to U.S. authorized necessities,” it mentioned, “the USA helps the method that may result in the [Republic of Korea’s] civil uranium enrichment and spent gas reprocessing for peaceable makes use of.” In contrast to authorizing nuclear-powered submarines, granting South Korea consent for growing these applied sciences for civilian functions faces no quick authorized obstacles and doesn’t require Congressional approval.

Although loads of uncertainties stay, if the Trump administration continues down this path, it might pave the best way for South Korea’s nuclear latency. The important thing query, then, is whether or not Washington ought to help this improvement. Nevertheless provocative this may increasingly sound, my reply is “sure”—not as a result of nuclear latency comes with out danger, however as a result of all of the alternate options could also be even worse for U.S. pursuits.

Though South Korea’s acquisition of enrichment or reprocessing expertise wouldn’t, in itself, violate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), these capabilities are inherently proliferation-prone. They allow a state to supply fissile materials, which is essentially the most technically demanding step in constructing a nuclear weapon. As soon as mastered, such capabilities dramatically shorten the timeline and decrease the political and financial prices of nuclear armament.

For that reason, Washington has lengthy restricted recipients of its civilian nuclear help from pursuing enrichment and reprocessing applied sciences with out specific U.S. consent. This reluctance stems from the potential damaging penalties for the worldwide nonproliferation regime. If South Korea acquires these capabilities, different international locations, equivalent to Saudi Arabia and Turkey, might search to do the identical, and U.S. efforts to stop their pursuit would inevitably provoke accusations of double requirements. The broader diffusion of nuclear latency would, in flip, make the worldwide safety atmosphere considerably extra fragile.

These considerations are reliable. However the USA’ alternate options are fraught as nicely.

1. Keep the Standing Quo

The present method—counting on prolonged deterrence whereas limiting South Korea’s nuclear choices—is more and more untenable. South Koreans proceed to query the credibility of U.S. safety ensures, and public help for nuclear armament stays excessive. Even after the 2023 Washington Declaration and the launch of the Nuclear Consultative Group, which demonstrated robust U.S. dedication to defending South Korea, help for an indigenous arsenal dipped solely briefly earlier than rebounding to just about 73 % by early 2024—and rising to greater than 76 % after Trump returned to workplace final 12 months.

This implies that it doesn’t matter what the USA does to bolster its deterrence, it is probably not enough to handle South Korea’s enduring skepticism over whether or not the USA would actually danger New York, Los Angeles, or Chicago to defend Seoul. That concern is changing into extra acute as North Korea strikes nearer to possessing a dependable functionality to strike the U.S. homeland. As soon as North Korea can credibly threaten U.S. cities, the prices and dangers of defending South Korea may develop into too excessive for the USA.

In opposition to this backdrop, Washington’s mantra of strengthening “the credibility of the U.S. prolonged deterrence dedication” is unlikely to assuage South Korea’s sense of insecurity.

2. Deploy Tactical Nuclear Weapons to South Korea

 This selection affords minimal strategic profit. Though some in Seoul help the concept, redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons can also be unlikely to handle South Korea’s underlying strategic considerations. Whereas such a transfer would possibly create the looks of a stronger U.S. dedication, it might stay squarely inside the conventional framework of prolonged deterrence, with Washington retaining full operational management.

Given the proximity of the 2 Koreas, Seoul would virtually actually push for shared and even pre-delegated launch authority to account for compressed resolution timelines—eventualities during which a response is required inside minutes, moderately than hours. Washington, nevertheless, is very unlikely to just accept such an association. Because of this, South Korea would stay depending on U.S. decision-making for nuclear use, perpetuating the very vulnerability that drives its curiosity in nuclear autonomy.

Redeployment dangers creating the worst of each worlds: South Korea would develop into extra susceptible, notably for North Korean or Chinese language strikes on nuclear storage amenities, whereas nonetheless missing autonomous management over nuclear weapons.

On the identical time, this feature would impose substantial prices on the USA, each with reference to the logistical and monetary burden of nuclear weapon storage and the authorized considerations this is able to elevate beneath Article I of the NPT, which prohibits nuclear-weapon states from transferring nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states.

3. Help or Abandon a Nuclear South Korea

If Washington fails to handle Seoul’s safety considerations, South Korea might select to develop its personal nuclear arsenal. As soon as thought of unthinkable, this feature may develop into unavoidable if the perceived prices of missing an unbiased deterrent start to exceed the prices of buying one. America would then face an unenviable alternative: help (or quietly condone) South Korea’s nuclearization, or sever the alliance. Neither end result would serve U.S. pursuits.

Supporting a nuclear-armed South Korea would significantly undermine the worldwide nonproliferation regime. Although the regime has arguably weathered North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear ambitions to this point, the injury attributable to a law-abiding member overtly pursuing nuclear weapons—with at the least tacit U.S. help—can be much more profound. If the principal architect and guarantor of the nonproliferation regime had been seen as enabling such a transfer, all the system’s credibility can be gravely, maybe irreparably, broken. The following collapse of this multilateral framework would virtually actually speed up the unfold of nuclear weapons globally.

However, distancing from or abandoning a nuclear South Korea would impose huge prices on the USA. Shedding a trusted ally with substantial army, financial, technological, and industrial capabilities would considerably weaken its strategic footing in a important area. As U.S. Forces Korea Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson not too long ago famous, the Korean Peninsula’s geostrategic location offers cost-imposition capabilities in opposition to each Russian and Chinese language forces, making the U.S. army presence there a supply of “vital strategic benefit.”

In opposition to these alternate options, allowing South Korea to take care of nuclear latency affords Washington a number of benefits.

First, nuclear latency may improve stability on the Korean Peninsula by mitigating South Korea’s safety fears and by decreasing North Korea’s incentives for restricted typical or tactical nuclear assaults. The credible prospect that South Korea may assemble nuclear weapons inside months and retaliate would diminish the enchantment of aggression except North Korea may confidently destroy all the latent South Korean arsenal—unlikely given its weak intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities—or is keen to danger an all-out warfare.

Nuclear latency would additionally give South Korea leverage in future risk-reduction talks with North Korea, which has lengthy dismissed South Korean overtures. Counterintuitive as it might appear, a managed diploma of nuclear latency may contribute higher inter-Korean stability.

Second, supporting South Korea’s nuclear latency may strengthen the USA’ broader Indo-Pacific technique. Acknowledging its ally’s safety considerations would sign belief and respect, reinforcing cohesion inside the relationship. And in sensible phrases, preserving U.S. political help for South Korea’s pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines doubtless requires framing them as serving a regional safety function past deterring North Korea, since some argue diesel-electric submarines might suffice for peninsula-focused missions. Forged as contribution to regional burden-sharing, this program, as soon as operational, would ease strain on U.S. submarine manufacturing capability whereas strengthening deterrence in opposition to China.

Lastly, South Korea’s improvement of enrichment capabilities would assist dilute Russia’s and China’s dominance of the worldwide nuclear gas market. Collectively, Russia and China at present provide greater than 60 % of the world’s low-enriched uranium (LEU) and virtually all high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), important for next-generation reactors. America is stepping up efforts to develop its personal nuclear gas manufacturing, however permitting South Korea to supply LEU and HALEU at scale would additional bolster power safety for the USA and its companions.

Not one of the selections dealing with Washington are with out danger. However the query isn’t whether or not supporting South Korea’s nuclear latency is right. It’s whether or not the alternate options—South Korean nuclear armament and shedding South Korea as an ally—can be higher. They’d not.

Permitting South Korea to develop managed nuclear latency beneath strict safeguards and efficient oversight would be the most tolerable possibility: one which strengthens deterrence, preserves the alliance, helps U.S. technique in Asia, and nonetheless provides Washington time to handle any potential South Korean breakout earlier than it happens.

In a world of imperfect choices, the least unhealthy alternative may be essentially the most prudent one.

This text is tailored from Every little thing however the Bomb: South Korea’s Nuclear Hedging Technique, forthcoming from Stanford College Press.