Think about China launching an invasion of Taiwan, and the US decides to return to the island’s protection. Following the Pentagon’s doctrine and operational ideas for combating such a warfare, the U.S. Navy and Air Pressure launch hundreds of long-range missiles in opposition to Chinese language ships, command facilities, and logistics hubs. Within the opening strikes alone, greater than 33,000 precision-guided munitions goal over 8,500 places. Cyberattacks decimate Chinese language navy networks and paralyze the management. Beijing is compelled to retreat or face defeat in what seems to be a swift, decisive U.S. success. Few U.S. lives are misplaced on this speedy, technology-driven triumph.
If this looks as if the perfect situation to you, you’d be incorrect. For as precision strikes destroy Chinese language missile launchers, command facilities, and communications networks, Beijing’s navy leaders face cascading navy failures at the same time as they’re remoted by degraded communications. In a second of panic concerning the speedy success of their adversary, the Chinese language management could nicely think about vertical escalation—the usage of nuclear weapons—earlier than its remaining capabilities are eradicated. Beijing would possibly authorize an indication nuclear strike over open waters as a sign of resolve and as an try to halt U.S. operations. It’s then unclear whether or not Washington will interpret such an indication as justification for preemptive nuclear strikes in opposition to remaining Chinese language capabilities.
Think about China launching an invasion of Taiwan, and the US decides to return to the island’s protection. Following the Pentagon’s doctrine and operational ideas for combating such a warfare, the U.S. Navy and Air Pressure launch hundreds of long-range missiles in opposition to Chinese language ships, command facilities, and logistics hubs. Within the opening strikes alone, greater than 33,000 precision-guided munitions goal over 8,500 places. Cyberattacks decimate Chinese language navy networks and paralyze the management. Beijing is compelled to retreat or face defeat in what seems to be a swift, decisive U.S. success. Few U.S. lives are misplaced on this speedy, technology-driven triumph.
This text has been tailored from How the US Would Battle China: The Dangers of Pursuing a Speedy Victory by Franz-Stefan Gady (Oxford College Press, 256 pp., $34.99, November 2025).
If this looks as if the perfect situation to you, you’d be incorrect. For as precision strikes destroy Chinese language missile launchers, command facilities, and communications networks, Beijing’s navy leaders face cascading navy failures at the same time as they’re remoted by degraded communications. In a second of panic concerning the speedy success of their adversary, the Chinese language management could nicely think about vertical escalation—the usage of nuclear weapons—earlier than its remaining capabilities are eradicated. Beijing would possibly authorize an indication nuclear strike over open waters as a sign of resolve and as an try to halt U.S. operations. It’s then unclear whether or not Washington will interpret such an indication as justification for preemptive nuclear strikes in opposition to remaining Chinese language capabilities.
It isn’t China’s nuclear doctrine per se that creates this harmful escalation dynamic, however quite the US’ most popular warfighting method. Not like Russia and the US, with their a lot bigger nuclear arsenals, Beijing could not but imagine that it might stand up to a U.S. nuclear first strike and nonetheless have the power to strike again—the essential deterrent in opposition to a nuclear first strike to start with. China’s nuclear arsenal is quickly increasing, however it’s nonetheless small relative to that of the US. (China had roughly 600 operational warheads as of 2024 in comparison with the US’ estimated 3,700.) This vulnerability may compel Chinese language leaders to make use of nuclear weapons early in a battle quite than threat dropping them to continued U.S. strikes.
The escalation threat is amplified by a selected side of Chinese language armament: Its navy possesses dual-capable missile methods and services that may launch each standard and nuclear warheads. U.S. strikes in opposition to standard DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile websites or DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile launchers and their command facilities might be interpreted by Beijing as assaults on its nuclear deterrent, probably triggering Chinese language nuclear retaliation.
The DF-26 presents a very acute entanglement downside. These launchers include standard and nuclear warheads, which are sometimes situated on the identical navy bases. Brigades observe drills launching standard assaults earlier than reloading the launchers with nuclear warheads. If the US targets these missile websites to forestall standard strikes on U.S. forces, the Chinese language management could interpret the assaults as aimed in opposition to the Chinese language nuclear deterrent and as preparation for a U.S. nuclear first strike. Within the warmth of battle, this can be a harmful ambiguity that might inadvertently set off nuclear escalation.
U.S. navy planners are caught in an inconceivable dilemma. By persevering with to give attention to the sort of warfare they’ve all the time deliberate for—a speedy, decisive navy marketing campaign to paralyze Chinese language forces and their management—they’re growing the chance of that management seeing no manner out however escalation. On the similar time, useful resource constraints make these U.S. warfighting plans unlikely to achieve the primary place.
The warfare method that U.S. operational ideas favor—focusing on Chinese language Command, Management, Communications, Computer systems, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) methods with long-range missiles and cyber results—would possibly additionally really delay and not diminish the prospects for lengthy and damaging wars. These methods embody all the pieces from navy communication networks to intelligence-gathering satellites and command headquarters that coordinate navy operations.
Even when commanders are killed and command methods decimated in a mass barrage, planners mustn’t assume that this interprets into a fast victory. Historical past means that forces usually proceed combating till they’re bodily destroyed. Think about that giant numbers of Russian generals have been killed within the first yr of Russia’s warfare in Ukraine, but the forces they commanded proceed operations to this present day. Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Islamic State remained efficient navy forces regardless of focused decapitation—till their forces have been systematically destroyed in grinding navy campaigns.
Nonetheless, the uncomfortable reality is that the US will not be ready for something near a grinding warfare of attrition in East Asia. In latest warfare video games, the U.S. navy was projected to exhaust its stockpile of maritime strike missiles in simply three days and its whole stock of standoff land-attack weapons in 10 to 14 days. Different munitions classes didn’t fare higher. Battle video games confirmed that Taiwan, with assistance from the US and Japan, defeated a Chinese language amphibious invasion in most situations, however this victory got here at a devastating value: dozens of U.S. ships sunk, a whole bunch of plane destroyed, and tens of hundreds of U.S. servicemembers killed. Latest information that the Pentagon is urgently pushing missile suppliers to double and even quadruple manufacturing of essential weapons, together with lengthy vary anti-ship missiles and precision strike missiles needs to be welcomed. Nevertheless it doesn’t resolve the escalation downside: The popular U.S. warfighting idea makes a nuclear change extra, not much less, probably.
Given Washington’s lengthy and outsized affect on navy pondering inside NATO, these dangers prolong far past the Pacific. Throughout latest workshops with NATO warfare planners and German high-ranking navy officers that I attended, each teams confessed to a troubling hole between their very own plans for combating a possible warfare with Russia and the way political leaders in capitals like Berlin envision such confrontations unfolding. The escalation mechanics constructed into the U.S. navy’s operational ideas are poorly understood outdoors navy circles—and generally not nicely understood inside them.
Nuclear strategists usually brush off escalation considerations, embracing daring actions below the banner of deterrence. They echo Gen. Ulysses S. Grant’s admonishment to his officers through the 1864 Overland Marketing campaign, who feared what Accomplice Gen. Robert E. Lee might need up his sleeve. “Return to your command and attempt to assume what we’re going to do ourselves, as an alternative of what Lee goes to do,” Grant reportedly mentioned.
To a point, the strategists downplaying escalation dangers are proper. The mere chance of nuclear escalation mustn’t stop the US from combating China—that may be self-deterrence, which may imply dropping a warfare earlier than it’s fought. But when the US is making ready for the potential of having to combat, it must be clear concerning the ultimate objectives, acceptable dangers, and methods to mitigate these dangers.
A greater manner ahead can be what I might name a “good attritional method.” This is able to adapt the Pentagon’s deterrence-by-denial technique by specializing in beating again a Chinese language invasion with out essentially triggering vertical escalation. This method intentionally avoids widespread strikes on command and management property which can be probably linked to China’s nuclear deterrent, recognizing that such assaults might be perceived by Beijing as existential threats to the survival of the Communist Occasion regime.
Such an tailored technique accepts that trendy warfare between nice powers will probably be characterised by standard attrition. It prioritizes investments in weapons methods that ship better firepower in shut fight: expanded torpedo manufacturing for the warfare at sea, shorter-range unmanned methods working at scale, and medium-to-long-range air and missile protection methods positioned to repel invasion forces.
This doesn’t imply abandoning present deep strike capabilities totally, however quite reverting to their authentic position as instruments to form the battlespace quite than because the decisive shortcut to victory or defeat. It means accepting that technological superiority alone can not assure swift success in opposition to a peer competitor.
Sadly, embracing a wise attritional method will not be possible because of the continued incapability of the US to commit the mandatory sources, which in flip stems from the absence of political and social consensus about the necessity to militarily confront China over Taiwan within the first place. Certainly, dropping one-half to two-thirds of U.S. Air Pressure and Navy property, to not point out hundreds of service members, for the preservation of an impartial Taiwan, as some warfare video games venture, may not characterize the very best long-term technique for a world energy like the US.
The premise for any technique, due to this fact, is an trustworthy dialog about what People are keen to sacrifice for Taiwan’s independence. As navy historian Michael Howard famous, the West has been “crusing via the fog of peace.” The better the space from the final nice energy warfare, the better the possibility of a catastrophic error.
The trail ahead requires abandoning comfy illusions. If the US chooses to defend Taiwan, it should construct the economic capability for protracted battle, embrace operational ideas that reduce escalation dangers, and actually talk to the American folks what such a warfare would value and why it could be fought. What the U.S. navy can not do is to proceed crusing via the fog of peace and faux that technological superiority ensures swift success, that escalation dangers are manageable, and that wartime realities will align with peacetime assumptions. To borrow from the good Athenian strategist Thucydides: The following nice energy warfare might be a stern trainer.
