In late February, Russia’s battle towards Ukraine entered its fifth 12 months, and some days later, the US and Israel launched large air strikes on Iran. As well as, European and Asian states are actually arming up on the quickest price for the reason that Chilly Battle, and a battle between the US and China over Taiwan stays an actual risk. Towards this darkish background, it is very important revisit long-standing discussions about how army energy must be utilized to realize strategic objectives; the best way to measure and decide army energy precisely; and what components past army drive might affect the end result of battle.
One wonderful contribution to this debate is a not too long ago printed guide by Phillips Payson O’Brien. In Battle and Energy: Who Wins Wars—and Why, O’Brien, who’s a professor of strategic research on the College of St Andrews in Scotland, reminds us that the end result of battle might certainly be influenced by features past weapons, air energy, and the variety of troopers. He argues {that a} extra holistic method to how army may is normally measured will enhance our understanding of who wins wars and why—and doubtlessly even deter states from going to battle within the first place.
In late February, Russia’s battle towards Ukraine entered its fifth 12 months, and some days later, the US and Israel launched large air strikes on Iran. As well as, European and Asian states are actually arming up on the quickest price for the reason that Chilly Battle, and a battle between the US and China over Taiwan stays an actual risk. Towards this darkish background, it is very important revisit long-standing discussions about how army energy must be utilized to realize strategic objectives; the best way to measure and decide army energy precisely; and what components past army drive might affect the end result of battle.
One wonderful contribution to this debate is a not too long ago printed guide by Phillips Payson O’Brien. In Battle and Energy: Who Wins Wars—and Why, O’Brien, who’s a professor of strategic research on the College of St Andrews in Scotland, reminds us that the end result of battle might certainly be influenced by features past weapons, air energy, and the variety of troopers. He argues {that a} extra holistic method to how army may is normally measured will enhance our understanding of who wins wars and why—and doubtlessly even deter states from going to battle within the first place.
Battle and Energy: Who Wins Wars—and Why, Phillips Payson O’Brien, PublicAffairs, 288 pp., $30, October 2025
O’Brien begins the guide by analyzing the false however widespread prediction of a fast Russian victory towards Ukraine in 2022. Not solely Russian President Vladimir Putin however the overwhelming majority of Western politicians, analysts, and commentators overestimated Russian army energy and underestimated that of Ukraine. The guide was written and printed earlier than the current U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran, however given O’Brien’s tackle the US’ makes an attempt at regime change in Iraq and Afghanistan, it’s in all probability honest to imagine that he would have suggested Washington to not undertake a equally overconfident endeavor in Iran. The guide ends with a stark warning to Beijing and Washington to not begin a cataclysmic battle primarily based on misperceptions about one another’s army capabilities.
The guide engages with the subject of battle and energy in 5 primary methods.
First, it takes a broad swing on the ineptness of governments, intelligence communities, and academia in assessing army energy and predicting the end result of battle. O’Brien notes that as a result of complexity of things concerned, wars seldom develop as deliberate and infrequently go off the rails, lasting for much longer than the aggressor anticipates. The creator argues that some of the basic issues within the evaluation of battle is the tendency to deal with battles, with wars unfolding in a a lot bigger and extra advanced context than single battles or aerial bombing campaigns.
That is after all not new. Prussian army commander Helmuth von Moltke is famously mentioned to have said within the Eighties that “no plan survives first contact with the enemy.” Furthermore, it’s extensively acknowledged that European army technique shifted from a deal with battles to a extra complete view through the Napoleonic wars, whereas in China, a broad strategic understanding of warfare is obvious in classical texts written so long as 2,500 years in the past. However, because the wars launched by Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump clarify, army planners and decision-makers have to be repeatedly reminded concerning the complexity of battle.
Second, O’Brien contends that the chance of analytical failure predicting the end result of battle will increase if sociopolitical components reminiscent of a state’s political system, management, social material, and can to combat are omitted from the calculation. He stresses that militaries are merchandise of a state’s whole energy; a army can solely be as robust because the financial and technological sources that underpins it, the political and army management that guides it, and the bigger society it serves. Students have lengthy debated why society issues in figuring out the success and failure of army may, and the position of strategic tradition is effectively acknowledged. But O’Brien is worried that analytical communities in most nations proceed to neglect these variables when assessing army energy. This analytical weak spot, he writes, is commonly enhanced by the occupation’s love for narrowly designed, battle-focused battle video games to explain the anticipated course of a battle.
O’Brien additionally blames the realist faculty of worldwide relations—and what he considers its fixation on onerous energy and army components—for the flawed methodology utilized by analysts and lecturers once they measure army energy. The origin of O’Brien’s criticism is that some distinguished representatives of the realist faculty blamed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on NATO’s supposed risk to Russia and the latter’s must safe its sphere of affect, some arguing on these pages that it might be ineffective for Western nations to ship weapons to Ukraine. O’Brien could be very important in the direction of what he sees as realism’s tendency to make use of steadiness of energy principle in such a deterministic method. Working throughout the realm of realism and classical geopolitics myself, I nonetheless perceive O’Brien’s level. In right this moment’s European safety context, it doesn’t make sense to offer in to Russia’s calls for for an prolonged sphere of affect, neither from a normative viewpoint nor from a steadiness of energy standpoint.
Nonetheless, the creator’s critique of the college of realism in worldwide relations is overly harsh, for a number of causes. For one, O’Brien fails to say that there’s an intense dialogue amongst realists about the best way to measure energy, and this debate is well accessible in main educational journals. Moreover, it’s deceptive to claim that the complete faculty of realism neglects home politics, management, and the non-material features of energy. Additionally, regardless of the shortcomings of solely assessing materials capabilities measuring army energy, it’s even riskier to make assumption about energy and battle primarily based on non-material components, or the whim of political leaders. Amongst all of the components informing a state’s capability to wage battle, onerous energy is undoubtedly crucial one. Onerous energy could also be inadequate to win a battle, however it’s unattainable to combat with out it.
Third, O’Brien asserts that realism has accomplished such a poor job of defining what a fantastic energy is that the idea has largely turn into meaningless, and he forwards “full-spectrum energy” instead idea. He’s important of Western analysts framing modern Russia as a fantastic energy—and drawing the conclusion that Ukraine, which isn’t a fantastic energy, was inevitably doomed. I totally agree with the creator’s evaluation that Putin’s Russia will not be a fantastic energy, not to mention a superpower in the identical league as the US and China, regardless of its huge geographic measurement and huge arsenal of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, “full-spectrum energy” is definitely a helpful measure to stipulate the entire vary of army and different capabilities a state possesses, from hybrid warfare instruments to traditional and non-conventional platforms. However, as a substitute of introducing new ideas, my recommendation can be that students and analysts alike try to be extra exact in utilizing well-established ideas reminiscent of superpower, nice energy, and second-tier energy. It stays analytically essential to tell apart between nice powers (or superpowers within the case of China and the US) and secondary powers, with second-tier states nonetheless compelled to adapt their insurance policies in keeping with the shifting energy and pursuits of the nice powers.
A U.S. Air Pressure picture exhibits passengers getting into an plane through the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan on Aug. 24, 2021. Grasp Sgt. Donald R. Allen/U.S. Air Forces through Getty Pictures
Fourth, with relevance to the continuing debacle in Iran, the guide takes a very onerous swing at the US’ quite a few failed makes an attempt at regime change. O’Brien posits that the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a strategic disaster, with regional chaos and opposition to the US throughout the complete Muslim world rising after the invasion. He considers the 20-year battle and regime change effort in Afghanistan a good bigger failure, with the U.S.-installed authorities in Kabul surviving for just for just a few hours after the U.S. withdrawal. There isn’t any denying that with the notable exception of Germany and Japan after World Battle II, the record of profitable makes an attempt at regime change and democracy-building could be very brief. Historical past tells us that it’s tough to win a nation’s hearts and minds by way of a army assault.
Fifth, the guide engages with the best way to measure the ability steadiness between the US and China—and the potential for these two juggernauts going to battle primarily based on miscalculations about their respective army energy. China and the US are superpowers—or full-spectrum powers, to make use of the guide’s time period—however O’Brien emphasizes and examines their respective strengths and weaknesses past protection budgets and the variety of weapon platforms; his curiosity is in what he calls pre-conflict army metrics.
One distinction highlighted within the guide is the 2 nations’ completely different financial fashions. The USA nonetheless has a technological benefit that permits it to provide extra superior weapons. China, as a producing powerhouse, can construct them in far better numbers. In case of battle, this may increasingly give the US a short-term benefit, whereas China has the higher hand in a protracted battle of attrition.
One other distinction examined within the guide is their distinct political techniques, with O’Brien claiming that U.S. democracy holds a bonus vis-à-vis China’s authoritarian regime when it comes to management in battle. As China’s command and management system arguably is nearer to Russia’s than to that of the US, the creator clearly has a degree. Russia’s method of battle in Ukraine will not be a very favorable precedent in his regard.
Chinese language army officers arrive in Beijing for the annual assembly of the Nationwide Folks’s Congress on March 8, 2025.Kevin Frayer/Getty Pictures
O’Brien additional argues that Washington has the higher hand when it comes to the 2 nations’ talents to rally the general public across the flag, however he’s apprehensive that the rising political instability in the US—whose society is more and more divided towards itself—might weaken its place. For my part, he underestimates the position of nationalism in China and the way the management might leverage this to rally the general public throughout battle.
The guide moreover debates the discrepancy when it comes to war-waging expertise. The USA possesses probably the most skilled army drive on the earth, whereas China has one of many least skilled ones. Within the Pacific theater of World Battle II, U.S. inexperience didn’t matter that a lot preventing Japan, however in trendy warfare, with its high-tech multi-domain operations, expertise issues lots. In a battle with China, expertise positively provides the US an essential edge, however that benefit might shrink if the battle drags on.
O’Brien additionally addresses the position of the U.S. alliance community in Asia, which not solely enhances the U.S. energy place however permits U.S. forces to keep up a ahead deployment in China’s neighborhood. Nevertheless, the creator expresses issues that the US below the Trump administration is undermining this benefit. In a protracted battle, China has an enormous dwelling benefit vis-à-vis the US when it comes to logistics, and this could after all be a good better issue if the U.S. alliance community within the area falls aside.
In sum, it seems that U.S. expertise, management, command and management techniques, and expertise waging battle would contribute to offer the US a bonus versus China—at the least within the preliminary levels of a battle, whereas the benefit is extra prone to tilt more and more in China’s favor in a extra protracted battle. O’Brien’s distinction between battles and wars is sort of essential on this regard. In distinction to Russia’s yearslong battle of attrition within the trenches and cities of Ukraine, a U.S.-China battle is extra prone to be a restricted battle at sea and thus nearer to what O’Brien defines as a battle.
In Battle and Energy, O’Brien engages with various essential points guiding battle and peace. One essential takeaway from the complexity of battle mentioned within the guide is that decision-makers ought to lean on a wealthy number of sources and specialists earlier than making a ultimate choice to go to battle. That that is seldom the case is a troubling concern raised within the guide. Leaders hardly ever have good info—not in democracies and definitely not in authoritarian states. O’Brien debates at size the implications of Putin’s development of a political system in Russia that solely feeds him with info he desires to listen to, and the creator airs his issues about related developments in Beijing and Washington. For this warning alone, the guide deserves a large readership.
