The yr forward gives the Philippines a possibility to form the regional agenda at a important second. On Jan. 1, Manila assumed the yearly rotating chair of the Affiliation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which empowers the Philippines to set the agenda and convene the regional bloc on points it believes are of high concern. Because the nation’s function as chair comes with intense scrutiny, it additionally carries an actual danger of underperformance. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and his administration should navigate persistent intra-ASEAN divisions whereas hoping in opposition to all expectations that neither Beijing nor Washington additional complicates issues. For Manila, 2026 can be a yr of strategic tightrope strolling.
On maybe an important safety subject for the bloc, the Philippines has pledged to conclude a legally binding Code of Conduct (COC) within the more and more contested South China Sea by the tip of its chairmanship. The issue: Like many different ASEAN initiatives, this might be largely symbolic, because the textual content lacks any clear enforcement mechanisms and is unlikely to be legally binding in any respect. Reasonably, leaked particulars of the draft textual content counsel that ASEAN seeks to codify new compliance measures, reminiscent of the necessity to peacefully negotiate sovereignty disputes; implement confidence-building measures and procedures to handle incidents; and conduct joint oversight to make sure achievement of the COC’s obligations.
The yr forward gives the Philippines a possibility to form the regional agenda at a important second. On Jan. 1, Manila assumed the yearly rotating chair of the Affiliation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which empowers the Philippines to set the agenda and convene the regional bloc on points it believes are of high concern. Because the nation’s function as chair comes with intense scrutiny, it additionally carries an actual danger of underperformance. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and his administration should navigate persistent intra-ASEAN divisions whereas hoping in opposition to all expectations that neither Beijing nor Washington additional complicates issues. For Manila, 2026 can be a yr of strategic tightrope strolling.
On maybe an important safety subject for the bloc, the Philippines has pledged to conclude a legally binding Code of Conduct (COC) within the more and more contested South China Sea by the tip of its chairmanship. The issue: Like many different ASEAN initiatives, this might be largely symbolic, because the textual content lacks any clear enforcement mechanisms and is unlikely to be legally binding in any respect. Reasonably, leaked particulars of the draft textual content counsel that ASEAN seeks to codify new compliance measures, reminiscent of the necessity to peacefully negotiate sovereignty disputes; implement confidence-building measures and procedures to handle incidents; and conduct joint oversight to make sure achievement of the COC’s obligations.
What’s extra, even an aspirational, unenforceable settlement possible faces an insurmountable hurdle: Beijing has lengthy resisted any compliance mechanisms that would constrain its habits. China has particularly opposed language within the draft textual content that might ban establishing synthetic islands; navy use of maritime options reminiscent of reefs; blockades and different coercive actions; the institution of air protection identification zones; or requiring advance discover for navy workouts. By exempting such actions, Beijing has sought to undermine the power of the COC to police precisely the kind of unhealthy habits that affected littoral states need to rein in—and for this reason China stays reluctant to signal on.
Past substantive disagreements, China is unlikely to grant the Philippines—its most vocal challenger within the South China Sea and a U.S. treaty ally—any political or symbolic victory throughout its ASEAN chairmanship. As a substitute, Beijing has stored strain on the Marcos administration by way of gray-zone techniques, together with ramming Manila’s naval patrols, concentrating on them with military-grade lasers, and attacking them with water cannons. These actions are supposed to strengthen China’s so-called 10-dash line, an unlimited declare over the Taiwan Strait and many of the South China Sea, which is largely shared by six different littoral states. China’s declare contains a lot of the Philippines’s unique financial zone (EEZ), in direct contravention of the United Nations Conference on the Regulation of the Sea. China additionally formally claims sovereignty over Brunei’s, Malaysia’s, Taiwan’s, and Vietnam’s EEZs, and the 10-dash line has some overlap with Indonesia’s EEZ as nicely.
China additionally sees a possibility to check the Trump administration in an effort to assess america’ willingness to defend the Philippines beneath their mutual protection treaty. To its credit score, the administration moved shortly to sign help in step with the alliance: U.S. Protection Secretary Pete Hegseth visited Manila final yr to announce the creation of Process Pressure Philippines—a joint navy and operational crew tasked with increasing cooperation and deterrence. On the identical time, the administration has expressed its want to stabilize relations with Beijing forward of U.S. President Donald Trump’s deliberate go to to China in April. Previously, Trump has sought to keep away from navy confrontation over points he views as peripheral to core U.S. pursuits. Notably, the administration’s new Nationwide Safety Technique made no point out of the Philippines—an omission that means U.S. alliance priorities could also be shifting not simply in Europe however in Asia, too.
Manila’s home politics additional complicate its place. Though Marcos’s time period runs by way of 2028, choices made throughout the ASEAN chairmanship may form the subsequent presidential marketing campaign. Vice President Sara Duterte has emerged as his chief political rival, backed by her father, former President Rodrigo Duterte. (The elder Duterte is at present standing trial in The Hague for crimes in opposition to humanity associated to his 2016-22 anti-drug marketing campaign.) Political tensions between the Marcos and Duterte camps embody deep variations over China coverage: Rodrigo Duterte favored lodging with Beijing, whereas Marcos has leaned towards Washington. Sara Duterte has proven little hesitation in publicly difficult the administration of which she continues to be a component, a dynamic that would weaken Manila’s diplomatic cohesion at a delicate second.
ASEAN’s members concluded their third and last studying of the draft textual content in November 2024, clearing the best way for its approval. Malaysia didn’t try to conclude the COC final yr throughout its tenure as chair, most likely as a result of Beijing was not prepared and doing so may need sophisticated the confrontation within the South China Sea. Whereas Beijing stays unlikely to agree this time round, the truth that all of ASEAN (to incorporate the bloc’s latest member, Timor Leste, which joined in 2025) helps compliance mechanisms provides Manila leverage. The possible failure to safe China’s buy-in, nevertheless, would elevate uncomfortable questions on ASEAN’s means to advance its most formidable safety targets.
The continuing civil struggle in Myanmar presents one other key problem for Manila this yr. The regime is within the midst of nationwide elections that the majority exterior observers take into account to be fraudulent and designed to bolster its grip on energy. One believable state of affairs is that one set of ASEAN members will acknowledge the outcomes and one other received’t, in impact splitting the regional bloc and placing strain on the Philippines to keep up cohesion.
To this point, Manila has fallen in need of its diplomatic duties over the Myanmar subject. Below the 2021 5-Level Consensus, the ASEAN chair is tasked with appointing a particular envoy to interact each the navy junta and detained civilian leaders—and though the Philippines duly appointed the envoy, International Secretary Maria Theresa Lazaro, she solely met with regime officers. Critics argue that her engagement dangers legitimizing the junta whereas sidelining the opposition. Though a number of ASEAN members have taken comparable approaches, the Philippines—given its democratic credentials—is held to a better commonplace. A extra balanced strategy that features outreach to opposition figures could also be essential to protect ASEAN’s credibility.
ASEAN members attacking one another will even take a look at Manila’s management. Final yr’s border clashes between Cambodia and Thailand had been among the many most violent in a long time, and the cease-fire brokered late final yr stays fragile. If combating resumes, it will likely be the Philippines’s flip to show whether or not ASEAN can handle navy conflicts amongst its personal members with out counting on exterior powers, as Malaysia did when the United States after which China stepped in to dealer a decision of the Cambodia-Thailand battle.
The broader strategic setting could show much more tough to handle. Many ASEAN states welcome U.S. safety engagement within the area to steadiness China, however they’re deeply annoyed by the Trump administration’s imposition of steep tariffs. Philippine items now face a 19 % tariff in america, a surprisingly excessive price for a long-standing treaty ally. Final yr’s efforts to forge a unified ASEAN place and negotiating technique collapsed, leaving members to pursue their very own bilateral preparations with Washington. Certainly, it’s arduous to see how Manila may succeed the place Kuala Lumpur failed.
Moreover, U.S. management and participation in groupings such because the Quad, AUKUS, and the newer Pax Silica framework—which contains Singapore—feed issues that Washington’s rising concentrate on safety makes the battle to show ASEAN right into a simpler regional actor much more tough. The Philippines, nevertheless, is usually in favor of such safety initiatives. As certainly one of solely two U.S. treaty allies in Southeast Asia, Manila could battle to justify its help for these preparations to its neighbors, notably in opposition to the backdrop of expanded navy workouts and patrols that non-ASEAN powers are conducting, at instances instantly on the Philippines’s behalf, within the South China Sea and the heightened danger of confrontation with China.
On the identical time, Beijing continues to broaden its affect throughout the area. A number of ASEAN members have deepened ties with China-led establishments, together with BRICS—of which Indonesia turned a full member final yr—and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. By the Belt and Highway Initiative, China has leveraged infrastructure funding to construct political goodwill throughout Southeast Asia. Beijing has additionally taken benefit of rising regional angst over the Trump administration’s tariffs. Shortly after Trump introduced his tariffs final April, Chinese language President Xi Jinping visited Vietnam, pledging to keep away from tariff wars, improve regional stability, and promote predictable relations. As we speak, Beijing is extra entrenched in Southeast Asia than at any level in current historical past.
A sustained U.S.-China detente additionally stays doable, holding vital strategic implications for ASEAN and Manila’s chairmanship. Trump has repeatedly signaled curiosity in enhancing relations with Beijing, and his upcoming go to could make clear the administration’s strategy. Improved ties may scale back operational friction between U.S. and Chinese language forces, benefiting regional stability. However they may additionally undermine Manila’s goals. If Beijing concludes {that a} mutually accommodating new association with Washington provides it larger leeway for assertiveness within the Philippines’s EEZ, it could be even much less inclined than now to simply accept a binding COC that might prohibit its actions.
The Philippines has assumed the ASEAN chair at a fraught geopolitical second. Success just isn’t out of attain: Manila has an agreed draft COC textual content, choices to recalibrate its Myanmar diplomacy, and manageable regional disputes. Failure, nevertheless, would carry broader implications. If the Philippines can not advance ASEAN’s most consequential safety initiatives beneath sustained Chinese language strain and with unsure U.S. backing, it could sign that the boundaries of an ASEAN-led regional order have been reached. In 2026, Manila’s efficiency will due to this fact matter far past its personal borders.
