The person on the podium wore a darkish go well with and a pink tie. Behind him sat rows of dignitaries in entrance of an enormous wall, draped in gold, from which protruded a yellow hammer and sickle, framed on both aspect by 100-foot scarlet flags. In entrance of him, within the cavernous, red-carpeted corridor, sat greater than 2,000 delegates to the twentieth Folks’s Get together Congress in 2022. They listened attentively and took notes like their lives relied on it, which they could effectively have. The person, Xi Jinping, spoke for over two hours, throughout which his rapt viewers sometimes erupted in ecstatic applause. The second was each bland in its authoritarian predictability and a sea change in Chinese language politics.
This text is customized from Autocracy 2.0: How China’s Rise Reinvented Tyranny (Cornell College Press, 244 pp., $29.95, November 2025).
Xi was formally taking workplace for the third time, after altering the Chinese language Structure to make it attainable. The transfer was a putting rejection of Chinese language Communist Get together (CCP) norms that had been designed to guard China from the personalism related to Mao Zedong’s rule. The political and financial reforms of the post-Mao period supported China’s gorgeous financial rise from poverty to the world’s second-largest financial system and succeeded in fostering innovation.
Many observers argue that autocracies are unable to domesticate innovation, which is crucial for sustaining progress. However by pursuing what I name “good authoritarianism,” China’s leaders, influenced by the expertise of Singapore, tailored their instruments of authoritarian management for a globalized data age. Recognizing the strain between political management and the situations wanted to encourage innovation, the CCP ruled with extra inclusive financial insurance policies and low-intensity repression.
China’s good authoritarianism, alongside an enormous innovation push, led to its fast rise from expertise copycat to main innovator. The 2025 International Innovation Index put China throughout the world’s high 10 most progressive nations, previous France, Germany, and Japan. Chinese language innovation is translating to significant industrial success, even dominance, in quite a lot of high-tech sectors. And it is usually shaping the army steadiness vis-à-vis the US—significantly in synthetic intelligence, telecommunications, supercomputing, and quantum communications.
However when Xi stood earlier than that big gold hammer and sickle, many consultants argued that by flouting time period limits, centralizing energy, and doubling down on statist financial insurance policies, he was transferring away from good authoritarianism towards insurance policies that will stifle innovation. Some economists, resembling Nicholas Lardy and C. Fred Bergsten, have been cautiously optimistic, believing that China may nonetheless expertise progress. However many different observers expressed deep skepticism in regards to the nation’s future financial progress and great-power standing, anticipating Chinese language decline.
The skeptics are right that China’s financial system faces actual challenges to future progress—and {that a} “neo-authoritarian” flip could also be one in all them. Certainly, China’s capability to stay a superpower is dependent upon its continued capability to compete on the technological frontier—which is dependent upon the CCP’s continued administration of the tensions between authoritarian management and the freedoms and openness of a contemporary, globalized financial system.
Chinese language President Xi Jinping delivers a speech on the twentieth Nationwide Congress of the Communist Get together of China in Beijing on Oct. 16, 2022.Lintao Zhang/Getty Photos
Pessimistic views of China’s financial future usually level to headwinds slowing its financial system. These headwinds—together with demographic challenges, environmental harm from fast industrial rise, and the chance of economic crises—are well-established causes of progress slowdowns in rising powers, and so they certainly pose challenges for Chinese language leaders to deal with. But slowing progress doesn’t essentially recommend decline. Economists remind us that each one quickly rising economies sluggish, with profitable nations settling in to round 1 or 2 % annual progress.
As China faces its headwinds, the query is whether or not its financial progress will proceed even at these much-reduced ranges. In some respects, leaders have positioned the nation effectively by investing closely in human capital, which economists discover key for profitable transitions to innovation-based progress. The CCP has additionally weathered quite a few challenges that skeptics predicted would weaken the regime or hurt the financial system. The celebration, analyst Jonathan Czin argues, “has demonstrated itself to be an extremely efficient studying establishment.”
To compete in opposition to the US, China wants neither to surpass the U.S. financial system nor even to achieve high-income standing. Traditionally—notably within the case of the Soviet Union—nice powers usually have solely a fraction of the main state’s financial would possibly but nonetheless can interact it in a harmful safety competitors. However to compete successfully, China should stay on the international technological frontier. It will require the CCP to proceed managing the tensions between staying in energy and offering the situations that foster innovation—a feat that many skeptics doubt the regime can carry out.
China within the early 2000s is remembered as being flush with power and exploring new freedoms and openness. “Particular person Chinese language,” George Gilboy and Eric Heginbotham noticed in 2001, are capable of journey overseas; they “at the moment are free to create their very own existence: they will transfer in regards to the nation, begin their very own companies, and categorical themselves on a variety of points.” Later, nonetheless, starting underneath President Hu Jintao, the CCP tightened state management over the financial system, civil society, and private freedoms. “The house for popular culture, excessive tradition, and spontaneous interplay has narrowed to a pinhole,” journalist Evan Osnos wrote in 2023. “Chinese language social media, which as soon as was a chaotic hive, has been tamed, as highly effective voices are silenced and discussions closed.”
Holding onto energy whereas making a extremely educated populace, permitting a dynamic civil society, and actively participating with the world is a difficult feat for an authoritarian regime. Certainly, many observers warn that Xi is tightening up due to the Soviet cautionary story and the hazards of perestroika: the dangers that permitting an excessive amount of freedom will finally topple the regime. Such fears are main Xi to “overreach” in the other way towards stultifying management, as political scientist Susan Shirk has argued.
Some observers have questioned whether or not China is following the trail of the Soviet Union. As Osnos wrote, “To spend time in China on the finish of Xi’s first decade is to witness a nation slipping from movement to stagnation and, for the primary time in a technology, questioning whether or not a Communist superpower can escape the contradictions that doomed the Soviet Union.” However China doesn’t need to go down this path.
Xi has certainly tightened CCP management over China’s state, financial system, and society. Adopting Maoist language, he proclaimed on the nineteenth Plenum, “It doesn’t matter whether or not it’s the authorities, the army, the individuals, or the faculties east, west, north, south, or the middle, the celebration guidelines all the things.” Because the 2008 monetary disaster, the CCP has moved to penetrate all of Chinese language society, aiming to create celebration workplaces inside all organizations. This consists of private-sector companies (together with international ones), NGOs, and universities. The CCP has taken direct possession in personal companies and handed a number of regulatory reforms to regulate their habits. The United Entrance Division, which additionally displays civil society organizations, now meets with enterprise house owners to convey CCP expectations and ensure that businesspeople “determine politically, intellectually and emotionally” with the celebration.
Observers argued that the Xi authorities’s efforts to crack down on the expertise sector particularly would stifle Chinese language innovation. They level to the CCP’s smacking of the ride-hailing app Didi after the corporate disobeyed authorities diktat to delay its preliminary public providing. Most famously, the CCP introduced the hammer down on Alibaba Group’s CEO, self-made billionaire Jack Ma, abruptly canceling the $37 billion IPO for Alibaba affiliate Ant Group after a infamous speech during which Ma publicly criticized the federal government. The celebrity CEO was compelled into retirement and light from prominence. As journalist Li Yuan argued within the New York Occasions, by way of its crackdown on tech, “Beijing tamed the trade’s ambition and blunted its progressive edge.”
Staff work on a circuit breaker manufacturing line at an electronics manufacturing facility in Fuyang, China, on Jan. 16, 2024.AFP by way of Getty Photos
The reversal of the tech crackdown, and China’s continued competitiveness within the sector, recommend such criticism is overstated. Accounts of the tech crackdown regularly neglect the numerous sound causes, associated to issues about information safety and the chance of economic crises, motivating the CCP to impose higher regulatory management. (Certainly, the U.S. authorities has related issues.) Moreover, critics registered the tightening however not the loosening; the CCP has since shifted its coverage, welcomed Ma again into the fold, ended its probe of Ant Group, and reissued companies’ licenses to interact within the gaming trade. Critics additionally ignore sectoral variation; laws within the AI sector have been stored intentionally lax with a purpose to encourage innovation.
On this interpretation, Xi’s crackdown on the tech sector was not an inexplicable personal objective dedicated by an uninformed or irrational chief; somewhat, it adheres to a sensible authoritarian logic of permitting freedoms when you may and imposing controls when you will need to. “Loosening causes chaos; tightening up causes dying,” Angela Huyue Zhang quotes in her guide in regards to the tech crackdown. Sensible authoritarianism is all about putting a steadiness with a purpose to keep away from both unhealthy consequence.
China’s shift towards a heavier hand for the state can also be lamented as misguided. However authorities involvement needn’t quash innovation. As political scientist Linda Weiss has argued, Washington’s funding and management performed a vital position within the creation of Silicon Valley and in encouraging the developments of key client sectors and army applied sciences. Importantly, she notes that the U.S. authorities delegated innovation to universities and personal companies. The U.S. “techno-security state,” describes China analyst Tai Ming Cheung, was “extremely pluralistic and decentralized.” In different phrases, state intervention isn’t essentially a foul factor—what issues is the best way that the federal government intervenes, and China’s success is dependent upon whether or not it could proceed to develop a wholesome innovation ecosystem.
That stated, the lingering affect of China’s state companies dangers dampening Chinese language innovation. The personal sector accounts for almost all of China’s innovation and nearly all of its high-tech exports. The state sector, nonetheless, continues to vacuum up a lot of the capital; state companies profit from preferential therapy by way of authorities loans and unfair limitations to entry that shut out personal companies. A failure to reform the state sector will undermine China’s technological competitiveness.
Students additionally argue that because the CCP makes an attempt higher management over the Chinese language financial system, higher personalism is diminishing the standard of governance. Shirk has commented that “the system seems to be reverting to dictatorial rule”: Xi, Shirk argues, is “scrapping the institutional norms and precedents that the celebration has constructed round its collective management since 1979.” These served as a Chinese language model of checks and balances—which Xi seems to be unraveling.
A return to personalism may certainly undermine Chinese language innovation. If cadres are chosen, promoted, and assigned on the idea of political loyalty somewhat than competence, this violates one of many key attributes of good authoritarian rule. At a time when the CCP is growing the extent of state involvement in innovation, assigning loyalist toadies to key financial roles within the paperwork can be disastrous for innovation and the financial system extra broadly.
Moreover, the success of the good authoritarian mannequin is dependent upon leaders having dependable data. Though the federal government censors exterior media, the CCP depends on an inside media for a frank presentation of challenges dealing with the nation. If personalism leads analysts to be afraid to current correct data to Chinese language authorities officers, this might additionally undermine China’s good authoritarianism—and, finally, innovation.
An electronics store worker in Hong Kong seems at a financial institution of tv units displaying Xi on Oct. 18, 2017.Anthony Wallace/AFP by way of Getty Photos
General, the skeptical view about China’s future attributes the nation’s sudden innovation success to the loosening of restrictions across the flip of the twenty first century. Accordingly, Xi’s abandonment of state-sector reforms, elevated personalism, and so forth will quash innovation, main China to comply with the Soviet Union’s slide off the worldwide expertise frontier. On this view, China’s innovation success was an sudden interregnum, however in the long run, authoritarianism—even the “good” sort—is incompatible with innovation-based progress.
This view could also be confirmed right, however just a few caveats are so as earlier than liberalism can declare victory. First, China exhibits us that authoritarian regimes can in truth generate innovation. Even when good authoritarianism is simply an interlude, it may be an extended and consequential one. Singapore’s “interlude” has lasted 60 years. In China’s case, if good authoritarianism lasts solely about 50 years, lots has occurred throughout that point: China returned to the great-power ranks, ended the unipolar period, made itself a contender for regional dominance in East Asia, and reworked the nationwide safety insurance policies of the US and different nations. Moreover, by way of the enchantment of its good authoritarian mannequin, its management in applied sciences of authoritarian management, and its relationship with Russia and different autocratic regimes, China is supporting a development of democratic reversals around the globe.
Second, this will not be an interregnum. Within the good authoritarian view, the CCP’s transfer towards higher management, which many observers interpret as bafflingly misguided, was a tactical response to years of extra relaxed insurance policies. Certainly, an ongoing subject amongst celebration leaders and intellectuals is the steadiness between democracy and authoritarianism, and the necessity, after intervals of reform, for a neo-authoritarian flip to right for issues that come up throughout liberalization. Scholar Xiao Gong Qing characterizes Xi’s coverage shifts not as regression to Mao, however as a prudent response to extreme liberalization. “If Deng Xiaoping developed the 1.0 model of neo-authoritarianism,” Xiao argues, “Xi is now creating the two.0 model. Xi needs to make use of an enhanced model of neo-authoritarianism to realize Deng’s acknowledged objectives.”
In different phrases, the good authoritarian view holds that the CCP’s neo-authoritarian flip was calculated and mandatory; it can allow the celebration to retain energy whereas allowing sufficient innovation and progress for China to compete successfully.
He Xiaopeng, co-founder and chairman of Chinese language electrical automobile maker Xpeng, pronounces a humanoid robotic throughout a information convention at its headquarters in Guangzhou, China, on Nov. 5.Jade Gao/AFP by way of Getty Photos
Nonetheless, China may fail at good authoritarianism in one in all two methods. First, as many consultants predict, the CCP would possibly tack too far towards stultifying overreach, inserting authorities management and corruption into what had been thriving and progressive sectors, in addition to isolating China from key markets, expertise companions, and analysis and academic networks. The second failure mode is perestroika: the results of tacking too far towards freedom and openness, with the CCP shedding energy because of this.
Some students could argue that herein lies the democratic benefit: that autocrats face inherent tensions between their capability to remain in energy and their capability to compete in a contemporary, globalized financial system. However democracies wrestle with tensions too: stopping factions and curiosity teams from capturing public coverage, in addition to balancing free-market financial insurance policies that maximize financial progress in opposition to the egalitarian and redistributive impulses that may regularly consequence from majoritarian politics. And democracies wrestle to keep up order in societies which can be based on ideas of restricted authorities and particular person rights. A failure to handle such tensions have induced vital home political instability and social division in the US and different liberal nations.
At the moment, the CCP finds itself in uncharted territory. “We’re watching a form of petri dish during which an experiment of extraordinary significance to the world is being carried out,” China professional Orville Schell has noticed. “Whether or not you may deliver collectively a one-party state with an progressive sector—each economically and technologically progressive—that’s one thing we thought couldn’t coexist.”
We’re additionally in uncharted territory with respect to the strategies utilized by autocratic regimes to remain in energy. The CCP fields unprecedented instruments of management, counting on facial recognition information analyzed by AI; spy ware put in on cell telephones to trace dissidents at house and exiles overseas; and, more and more, the exploitation of wearable applied sciences and the Web of Issues, together with biometric information and emotional detection expertise. “Digital authoritarians” might be able to exert highly effective management in methods that don’t undermine innovation.
Sensible authoritarianism depends on a regime’s calibrations between management and freedom. When leaders worry that their grip on energy is slipping, they are going to tactically rein in freedoms; at different occasions, regimes will enable higher freedoms to encourage progress and innovation. Some regimes fail to search out this steadiness and are ousted—as proven by the experiences of the shah of Iran and former Soviet chief Mikhail Gorbachev. Different authoritarian regimes, resembling South Korea and Taiwan, liberalized. However some good authoritarians keep in energy a very long time, and—in defiance of skeptics—can domesticate innovation. It’s an open query whether or not the CCP can successfully handle the challenges dealing with China’s financial system. However the lens of good authoritarianism explains how China acquired the place it’s at the moment: to a spot many observers stated it may by no means attain.
