Indonesia is usually described because the world’s greatest invisible nation. How blind we should be. It’s the world’s fourth-most-populated nation and its third-biggest democracy; it has about as many Muslims as Egypt, Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, mixed; and it has a shocking ecological, linguistic, and cultural range, unfold out over some 17,000 islands. Indonesia receives little or no media protection, however its perspective on world affairs is more and more essential, particularly as so-called center powers achieve in prominence.
On the newest episode of FP Stay, I spoke with former Indonesian vice overseas minister and ambassador to the US Dino Patti Djalal. Djalal is the founding father of the International Coverage Neighborhood of Indonesia and an astute watcher of worldwide affairs. Subscribers can watch the total dialogue on the video field atop this web page or observe the FP Stay podcast, which often drops on Fridays. What follows here’s a condensed and calmly edited transcript.
Ravi Agrawal: Do Indonesians really feel like their nation issues for the US?
Dino Patti Djalal: We definitely hope so!
U.S. engagement in Southeast Asia might want to dance with Indonesia as nicely. Now we have a complete and strategic partnership with the US—which we hope is a bipartisan factor—and sure, we do have good belongings. We hope that these belongings are appreciated by the Trump administration.
RA: Out of your vantage level in Jakarta, how do you see [President Donald] Trump in his second time period?
DPD: We hope his consideration to Southeast Asia, to ASEAN [the Association of Southeast Asian Nations], could be improved in comparison with the primary Trump administration. It’s extensively identified that he had by no means been to an ASEAN summit, didn’t appoint an envoy to ASEAN for a while, and left various posts vacant in Southeast Asia. So we do hope the second Trump administration can be extra lively and engaged in Southeast Asia.
However in Trump 2.0, we discover the U.S. retreating from world affairs. After all, this was a theme in Trump 1.0, however it’s extra intensified now. We used to see the US main in world affairs, not on each concern, however it was a significant pressure driving world affairs. So we’re seeing how this may influence the world and Southeast Asia. For instance, the U.S. pulled out its funding for IOM, the Worldwide [Organization] for Migration, which was about 70 % of the finances. And consequently, 1000’s of the employees at IOM had been laid off. The establishment is nearly dysfunctional now. And so the crucial concern, worldwide migration, is struggling. I’m simply speaking about migration. I’m not even relating well being, on local weather, and on different issues.
RA: What occurs in a world the place America has retreated? Does that fear Jakarta?
DPD: It worries us. We name the US a superpower, though Washington doesn’t name itself that. It has the biggest economic system. It has huge diplomatic, political, technological assets. Given these belongings, the world counts on the US to play an lively function.
But when the US retreats, it offers area for others to step in. Clearly, China is there. China is kind of fascinated by stepping up its engagement in Southeast Asia and on the worldwide stage. However there are additionally international locations like India, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Indonesia on some points. So it does create area for different powers to work amongst themselves and to step up on sure points.
A number of us are confused after we see the US now, as a result of the US is essentially the most values-driven nation by way of its overseas coverage and world engagement. It’s much less so now.
RA: Let’s discuss tariffs. Based on Trump’s preliminary reciprocal tariff calculation, they had been to be 32 % of tariffs on Indonesian exports. A brand new deal set tariffs at 19 %. How do these tariffs change Indonesia’s view on its relations with the world and the way it thinks about commerce with different international locations? It’s negotiating a free commerce take care of the EU, as an example.
DPD: With the EU, for instance, we’ve been negotiating a complete financial partnership settlement for 9 years. It was caught. It didn’t go anyplace. However proper after the Trump administration introduced the tariffs, we’re finalizing a take care of the EU. It’s a really beneficiant deal; 80 % of our items will go there tariff-free. We count on Indonesia’s exports to the EU to develop by 40 % or so within the subsequent three to 4 years. And European exports to Indonesia would develop equally—by 7 or 8 %? However either side agreed that this might not occur if there was not a tariff towards Indonesia. So, definitely, it has catalyzed new alternatives in commerce relations amongst international locations.
RA: How does Jakarta take into consideration Beijing’s ambitions within the area? How do points like democracy and safety and allyship issue into Indonesia’s relations with China?
DPD: First, it must be stated that Indonesia had hostile relations with China for many years after 1965. However issues normalized within the late ’80s, and we took a cautious, incremental strategy towards China. We have to know whether or not we are able to belief China to not intervene in our inner affairs. Indonesia is staunchly anti-communist. Little by little relations improved, belief elevated, and we ended up with a complete and strategic partnership just like the one we’ve with the US. I feel China’s leaders determined in some unspecified time in the future to alter their strategy in Southeast Asia and to prioritize relations with Indonesia. They modified how they take care of Southeast Asia and Indonesia and have become very concerned. They now compete with the US by way of diplomatic seductions, financial engagement, confidence constructing, and so forth.
We nonetheless have issues with China. It’s nonetheless an advanced relationship. However we don’t see China as a risk. There’s a larger diploma of belief relative to 4 a long time in the past.
RA: You say you don’t see China as a risk, however the US more and more does. These are your greatest buying and selling companions, primarily. How do you sq. that?
DPD: There’s not a lot we are able to do by way of U.S.-China rivalries, as a result of that’s past our management. However we are able to attempt to have an effect on how they behave in Southeast Asia. There are dialog companions for ASEAN. And we wish to be as shut as doable to each and preserve good relations to each as a result of there’s a doctrine of ASEAN centrality, that means ASEAN has to have good relations with all the foremost powers. Particularly the US and China. We will’t select, Ravi. We’re geopolitically polygamous. We date everyone as long as they create profit to us.
I inform my pals in Washington, “It’s possible you’ll be a superpower, however in Southeast Asia, you need to compete on your area. You compete not simply with China, you compete with India, you compete with Japan, you compete with the UAE, you may compete with Saudi, and so forth.” Southeast Asia is an oasis of progress, and regionalism there’s fairly totally different. For the US to be engaged, they should up their sport and never take us as a right.
RA: On a extra critical observe, every thing you’re saying labored properly in a world at peace. In the present day, main international locations are at conflict, and main powers are divided over that. And if China had been to assault Taiwan, that might create extra tensions in your area. So had been Indonesia to select, how wouldn’t it take into consideration that?
DPD: Effectively, as long as the selection doesn’t require us to enter right into a treaty alliance, we’ll take a stand on sure conflicts. And we do this very often. When the US invaded Iraq, we opposed it. It was very arduous as a result of our relationships had been actually enhancing with the US after 9/11. So we do take a stand, and it is determined by case by case, however we can’t enter into navy alliances.
However one essential level. Sure, there’s conflict in Europe. However Southeast Asia is comparatively peaceable. We had the Vietnam Warfare, the Cambodian battle, and plenty of inner wars, in addition to proxy wars. And now we’re free from all that. Folks see the South China Sea because the flash level, however there isn’t any dying and no conflict within the South China Sea. In comparison with Ukraine, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the Center East, that is one area the place all of the claimants are literally speaking collectively. China and the 4 ASEAN claimants are speaking peacefully in negotiations to finalize the code of conduct within the South China Sea. Taiwan is a giant concern for us, clearly. An outbreak of battle throughout the Taiwan Strait would disrupt the circulate of products round these waters and paralyze commerce, which might harm the Southeast Asian economic system. So we hope that Beijing and Taipei maintain their tensions low.
RA: I discussed that Indonesia has the world’s greatest Muslim inhabitants. That’s clearly affected its views of Israel. How do Indonesians view the Israeli-Gaza battle proper now?
DPD: Everyone knows the time period “double requirements.” Each authorities on the planet is responsible of that to some extent. After I was a diplomat, I admit I’d typically say one factor and do one other. However the double requirements round Israel’s navy assault in Gaza, which has been described as genocidal, displays a world whereby there are one algorithm for many states and a special set for Israel. It appears that evidently Israel is exempt from these guidelines. And I don’t know what it might take for a recognition that this can be a clear violation of humanitarian worldwide regulation. Some 60,000 civilians have been killed, most of whom are girls and youngsters. After all, a few of them are Hamas, but when this was executed by every other nation, that nation can be clobbered and sanctioned ruthlessly. For Indonesia, it’s the best diploma of double customary that we’ve seen on the planet system for fairly a while now.
RA: Clearly, you don’t communicate for the Indonesian authorities immediately, however you as soon as did. Wouldn’t it assist issues if Indonesia acknowledged Israel and had formal diplomatic ties with it? It may then have extra leverage on a few of these factors.
DPD: Our President Prabowo [Subianto]’s place is that we help the two-state answer. And we’ll participate within the Saudi-France-sponsored worldwide convention on this query. However our president has additionally stated not too long ago that if Israel acknowledged Palestinians’ independence, then Indonesia would do the identical towards Israel. So there’s motion on Indonesia’s stance.
RA: Distinction all of this with how Indonesia sees Russia’s conflict in Ukraine. Up to now, the Indonesian authorities has proposed plans to resolve the battle, however these concepts had been usually criticized by the West as parroting Russian speaking factors. How do you see it?
DPD: When President Prabowo was protection minister, he made some solutions about creating demilitarized zones or cease-fires. There was discuss of getting a referendum in a number of the occupied areas. He has not talked about that since turning into president, however the thought of a cease-fire that he talked about is now being mentioned by either side. Indonesia supported and is, in actual fact, one of many co-sponsors of the U.N. resolutions that known as for Russia to withdraw. So our place stays the identical. We hope that negotiations with either side will result in a cease-fire and a everlasting answer. And we stand by the U.N. decision that requires respect for Ukrainian sovereignty.
RA: Once you have a look at the state of the world immediately, how is world order shifting? And the way does Indonesia match inside that world order?
DPD: We’re within the midst of a transition. We’re forming one thing new, however sadly the form of that rising or the following world order stays elusive. We definitely must reform the establishments of that world order. The WTO [World Trade Organization] is dysfunctional. The nonproliferation treaty is being violated day by day. The work of the U.N. Human Rights Council shouldn’t be going nicely. The WHO [World Health Organization] shouldn’t be functioning nicely. America has pulled out of the local weather treaty. Once more, it’s simply struggling. The U.N. Safety Council is now not match for goal. When the conflicts world wide contain the pursuits of the US or China or Russia, they use their veto energy. So these establishments have gotten dysfunctional. That must be fastened within the new world order.
We stay dedicated to the U.N. Constitution. That doesn’t must be modified. However the best way we adhere to and act constantly on the rules of the U.N. Constitution stays crucial for the following world order that we’re shaping.
RA: If Indonesia may form or select what a reformed world order appears to be like like, the place wouldn’t it direct its energies? You’re arguing for a reform of the prevailing system. You need guidelines and norms. However what if China had been to grow to be greater and stronger and tries to impose its will on world order? Would Indonesia search that out or attempt to cease that?
DPD: Two factors on that. First, you increase an excellent query. Most international locations which are cynical concerning the world order and name for a brand new one haven’t specified what they need. America after World Warfare II was very particular concerning the rules-based world order that continues to be immediately. However when you ask Indonesia, India, Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa, Saudi, all of them have totally different conceptions, or no conceptions, about what buildings must be constructed, or how the previous buildings must be reformed. Actually we don’t wish to change the United Nations. That will be horrible, unthinkable. However how can we reform the U.N. and its organs and different worldwide establishments?
Secondly, as we search the following world, the very last thing we wish is to search out ourselves in a China-centric world. China is a superb energy, and we’ve good relations with China, however we wish a world the place everybody’s equal, the place there’s no hegemon and no spheres of affect. We wish to maintain our sovereignty and strategic autonomy. We wish to cooperate on the idea of equals. So we don’t need a China-centric world to interchange the previous world that’s not working anymore.
RA: And inside that, there’s a rising motion to broaden BRICS, which Indonesia has joined. There’s a way that center powers even have a rising function throughout the G-20. After which lastly, the worldwide south as an entire tends to coalesce extra immediately than it did a decade in the past on a spread of points, particularly local weather financing. Together with your perspective from Jakarta, how do you see that?
DPD: As we joined BRICS this yr, we’re additionally making use of to OECD [the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]. Hopefully, we’ll finalize that in 2027. We’re additionally making use of for CPTPP, the Complete and Progressive Settlement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. So we’re, once more, geopolitically promiscuous. We wish to have platforms in every single place and maintain our ft in several platforms.
Within the world south, the non-aligned motion is shedding a whole lot of steam. So the actions are seen to be happening in BRICS now. After all, BRICS has Russia. However India’s presence and South Africa’s presence in it make us fairly comfy. The vast majority of BRICS international locations are within the world south. BRICS has a bigger economic system now than the G-7, and there are extra international locations lining as much as be part of BRICS than to hitch the EU or G-7. So how BRICS evolves will provide attention-grabbing prospects.
And we hope that first, BRICS doesn’t grow to be a geopolitical unit. We might be uncomfortable to see BRICS turning into geopolitical. And secondly, Indonesia doesn’t need BRICS to be an anti-West grouping. And it’s a tough balancing act due to the presence of Russia.
RA: And Iran.
DPD: And Iran, sure. So we carry a balancing consider BRICS. Our line could be very clear. Now we have good relations with the West. We’re a proud democracy, and we don’t wish to grow to be anti-West. And the third want is extra private: change the identify. Would the U.S. be part of a bunch known as Sweden, Norway, and Germany? Clearly not. In order BRICS grows, it’s unusual or bizarre to be becoming a member of a giant group that’s extra consequential named: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. So I hope they modify the identify.